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UNLIMITED TRAINING
By ADMIRAL SANKleUI TAKAHASHI
From Pearl Harbor 10 tJlfl Solom0n8. tM Japanue Nar:y 11M had a 1olll1lJeriu
oj utraordinary ItlM;Uuelt wh.ich hmIe Jorced ad,nirutioll e_ Jrom Mr em:miu. The
.fapcJlltM Navy achieved IMH .nu:auelt in IIpW oj 1M Jact tIIcU tmlil recmlly iI tm8
M~rdy ha,ldkapped by tile Walthington Nawl Agremtenl. which aceorrl«l it onlr
tllirlJl per eenI oJ the 8i:e oJ tile combi"ed Anglo.Ammcan FletU. Japcm.~.
Aa. JOl/rtd the Iteenl of compenMUing Jor lack i,1 quall/jtg by MgA. quality. How thilt
h(J/I been QCCQtllplilthtd a,1d Ihe price thai had 10 be paid Jor ;, u told in 1M JollotDing
article.
Admiral Takalllu1&i, whMe pMlograpl1 will be fuund on page 30. if one oj
1M olu.taftding JapantM naval _rwkr'1t oj our age. He Nu Ileld 1M poftIioM
of CllieJ oJ Staff oJ 1M Corrtbined Fled. Pruidenl oJ the Naval &oJJ con•• Viee.
Cllief oJ lhe Naval General Staff. Commander in Cllie! oj the Combined FlM, ared
,"'uprtllle War COllncilor.-K.J,.
A FTER the German Far EasternSquadron had, at the beginning ofthe first World War, wiped out a
British squadron off Coronel, the Japanese
Navy replaced the British Navy ill the
defense of almost aU parts of the Pacific
and Indian Oceans. Leaving only a
few cruisers in the Indian Ocean, the
British Navy was able to concentrate aU
ita strength around Europe. In addition
to this, Japan, upon request of Great
Britain, organized a fleet cOllsisting mainly
of de troyers and dellpatched it to the
Mediterranean. With Malta as its base,
this fleet played an active role at the
side of tho Allies. A .Japanese fleet
which took charge of the Pacific and
Indian Oceans conducted joint operations
with the British Navy, with Singapore as
the base. At that time, I myself served
as a member of the General Staff of the
Japanese Fleet in Singapore.
When the war had been won by the
Allies with Japan's aid. Japan expected
the Anglo-American powers, which had
witnessed Japan's strength, to accord her
the treatment of an equal. Yet, although
Japan was 8upported in her attitude by
Italy, France, and several other coun-
tries, Britain and the United States raiaed
strong objections. It was at their sug-
gestion that the Washington Conference
WlLs held.
"THREE COURTESIES"
Japan, Britain, the United States,
France, and Italy participated in the con-
ference. In view of the assistance ren-
dered by Japan in the Great War, the
Anglo-American camp should have appre-
ciated the co-operation of the Japaneee
Navy. But Britain and the United States
repaid these services with what we have
called the "three courtesies:'
The first of these was the request to
return Tsingtao to China. At the Wash-
ington Conference, the Chinese dele-
gates treated Japan 88 though she were a
defendant and used abusive language
against her. Britain and the United
States adopted the attitude of judges and
requested the return of Tsingtao to China.
This question WlLs. after aU, one which
concerned only Japan and China and in
which Britain and the United States had
no right to interfere. Although the entire
Japanese nation should have been offended
by this arbitrary attitude, there were at
n\l.)l\UTED TRAIN)~G 11
that time many people in Japan who
were 80 lacking in spirit as to approve
the return of Tsingtao, out of a feeling
of submiBSion towards Britain and the
United States.
.The return of Tsingtao to China re-
sulted in new unrest in East Asia. China
reasoned as follows: "Although Japa11
adopts a strong attitude towards China,
she will always give way to pl'essure on
the part of Britain and the United States."
Ohina began to plan driving the Japanese
out of Manchuria, and the Manchurian
Incident occurred. I think the reason
....hy the Chiang Kai-shck regime is con-
tinUing ita useless resistance i8 that it is
Iti1l poese88ed by the false idea that Japan
will nece88&rily 8uccunlb if Britain and
the United States continue to side with
Ohina. In this respect, the Washington
Conference contributed its share towards
making China reject Japan's overtures.
"OPEN DOOR" AND 5:u:3
The eeoond "courtesy" of the W'ashing-
_ OoDference was the abandonment of
tile Japaaeee·British alliance. For Brit-
.. thiI alliance had been of immense
val. duriDa the Great War. After the
....ar, however, Britain saw no advantage
in it and, moreover, the United States
...... apiDBt it. 80 Britain di.ecarded the
alliance like aD old pair of ahoee. In ita
place, the Anglo-Americans set up the
N"me Power Pact, which guaranteed what
they called the "territorial integrity and
administrative independence" of China
and the principle of the "Open Door."
This pact aimed at tying Japan's hands
in the Orient. It furnished the USA
with oountless pretextM for condemning
J'fUl as the violator of treaty obliga-
...... However, it WlA8 imp088ible for
e7apm to live up to the treaty. The
tim. ~ changing, but Britain and
~ l1Dited States disregarded this and
tried to fetter Japan by the Nine Power
Pact to the ... quo.
TJae third "courtesy" of the Washing-
~ CoDferenoe was the naval armament
limitation. Par Britain and the United
Statee, the Japanese Navy had been
extremely valuable during the Great
War. Yet they had no desire to see the
Ja.panese Navy grow too strong. So,
a.fter making previollR arrangements be-
tween themselves for assuring their own
equality of naval power. Britain l\nd the
United States invited .'apan, Italy, and
}rance to the conference and rt'quci'ted
.In.pan to llCl.'Cpt the 5:5::l ratio for the
Heets of Great Britain. America, and
Japan. The .Japanese ~avy was t'x-
trcmely indignant. From the very be-
ginning, we all believed that it was
impossible for an independent nation to
agree to possesf\ing any force inferior to
that of Britain or the United States.
However, after II St>rics of diBCussiuns, the
authorities of the Japanese NaY)' pre-
sentt-'ll a plan demanding 70 in~tcl\d of
60 per cent of the United States naval
strength. But Britain and the United
States continued to insiRt on the reduc-
tion to 60 per cent. Eventually it was
agreed that Japan should possess 60 per
cent of the American or 30 per oent of the
combined Anglo-American naval strength
in capital Rhips and aircraft carriers.
JAPANESE REACTION
While we officers and men of the Navy
showed resentment at this, public opinion
at that time was not in perfect accord
with the opinion of the Navy. Some
quarters drew comparisons between Japan
and the United States in such things as
the wealth, productive power, and size
of the two countries, or even as regards
the buildings of New York and Tokyo,
concluding that .Japan had onJy 20 to
30 per oent of all the possc8t4ions of the
United States. Moreover, it is said that
there were Japanese, not only inside
Japan but even in the United States,
who uttered snch opinions. There "'ere
also certain people who thought that
Japan would cease to t'xiRt if she made
an enemy of Britain and the United
States.
At that time, Vice-Adrniral Kanji Kato,
President of the Naval Staff College, went
to Washington. He W8R so indignant
over the progress of the Conference that
members of the Japanese delegation
feared that he might commit suicide if
things came to the worst. When Vice-
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Admiral Kato returned to Tokyo, several
of us went to the station to meet him.
As soon as he alighted on the platform,
he said: "We were defeated in Washing-
ton. 'Ve do not deserve your welcome."
He called later on Fleet-Marshal Heiha-
chiro Togo and in tears explained to him
the details of the Washington Conference.
As I was told by Vice-Admiral Ogasawara,
the secretary of the late Fleet-Marshal
Togo, the Fleet-Marshal listened to him
for some time and finallY said: '~It is
very regrettable that the Japanese Navy
has been restricted to 60 per cent of the
United States Nary in quantity, but it
cannot be helped, since the nation has
promised it. But there is no limitation
in training, is there'l Even if there is a
limitation in quantity, training is un-
limited." Vice-Admiral Kato was deeply
moved by these words, and he took leave
of the Fleet-Marshal with a lighter heart.
A BATTLE LOST
All the contracting countries of tho
naval armaments treaty put it into
effect within two years of its conclusion.
America's main coutribution was to stop
the construction of those warships which
were on the building prov;ram; at the
same time, llhe converterl a part of her
capital ships into aircraft carriel'fl. In
this way she had to sink only one or two
"al'8hips. Japan stopped the construc-
tion of wl\rships on the buildinv. program
and also converted capital sl'ips under
construction into aircraft carriers. How-
ever, in addition to this and in order to
lower the ratio of the ca.pital ships to
60 per cent of that of the United States,
Japan had to sink ma·ny capital ships of
the second class,. such as the Katori,
Ka8hima, Aki, Satsumn, Kurama, l/eoma,
lbut"i, Hiun, IWQ.1ni, Saga'mi, Suo, Tango,
and others.
Warships are not only floating fortresses
which protect the nation: they are also
the homes of the officers and men of the
Navy. When Japanese naval men board
a warship, they are determined to defend
the nation and sink the enemy's warships.
If the fortune of battle is against them
and their ship is sunk, they are deter-
mined to share their ship's fate in the
waters of the Pacific. But in the two
years after the Washington Treaty, we
had ourselves to sink our beloved ships
with our own artillery, torpedoes, and
bombs: today the Katori was sunk, W.
morrow would be the Kashima's turn!
Until those ships disappeared into the
waters, leaving only a whirl on the surface
of the sea, the officers and men aboiml
the other warships saw them off. It
was their farewell service, and they sent
those ships oft with tears in their eyes.
At the table of the Washington Con-
ference, the Japanese Fleet had fought
with the Anglo-American combined fleet
and had been defeated. The Japanese
Navy now saw the results of this defeat
in these tragic scenes.
THE 168-HOUR WEEK
While the officers and men of the
Navy wept with resentment, Fleet-Mar-
shal Togo's exhortation to what was
called limitless training became deeply
engraved on their hearts. They under-
stood that the problem of quantity or
number was unimportant. Even if the
ratio were to be fixed at 50 or 40 or 30
per cent, it would make no difference.
"We must defeat our bitter enemies
Britain and the United States by every
means. We must avenge the K~Qri and
the Ka8Mma." This was the firm deter-
mination of the naval officers and men
at that time.
In 1927, Admiral Kanji Kato was
Commander in Chief of the Comb~ed
Fleet, and I was assigned to the poSt of
Chief of Staff. At the beginning of that
year, the Commander in Chief called all
the officers to his flagship the Nagato
and delivered an impassioned exhorta-
tion. He concluded with emphasis: "As
far as the Combined Fleet is concerned,
the war with the United States has already
begun. The training of the fleet in the
past has been severe, but from this year
on we shall have a still more vigorous
training. Be prepared for this. You
must not let the warships collide with
each other, but you can make them
scrape against eaeh other. Carry out
the training with this instruction in
mind!"
UXLJ~JITED TRAINING IS
In order to put such a program in
force, we found that the working week of
"Monday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday, Friday, Friday," which had
been the rule in the Japanese Navy
since 1008, was still inadequate. In this
schedule thcre was still time to rest at
night. The ditJerence between day and
night has disappeared entirely since the
beginning of the new training. Under
the Q>mmander in Chief, all members of
the fleet from now on underwent all-
night training. While warrant officers
and men had a chance to rest whenever
circumstances permitted through there
being two or three shifts, there were no
auch shifts for senior officers, who had
no men to relieve them. In this way,
~ng and maneuvers were conduoted
on the basis of actual sea warfare and, as
a result, the skill and fighting ability of
\he Navy have greatly improved, Thus,
with the progress of the training, the
real meaning of "limitless training" and
the po88ibility of thereby supplementing
the shortage of quantity were driven
home into the minds of aU.
WAR-LIKE TRAINING
", While striot training bears fruit, it is
liable to entail severe accidents, No one
knows ho.w many times warships were
cloee to colliding with~h other. "Look
out!" we have often had to cry breath-
lessly. But, somehow or other, there
was no major accident till the late summer
of 1927. Then in the pitch-dark night
of August 24 a serious accident oc-
curred during a maneuver in the Japan
Sea. A cruiser-flotilla had a head-on
collision with a destroyer-flotilla. The
destroyer Ifarabi, which was in the van,
collided with the cruiser J inUu and sank
immediately. And the destroyer Y08hi,
Whiah followed the 1Vambi, oollided with
tb& 8800Dd warship which foUowed the
Ji.uu. One third of the Y08hi was cut
away at the rear. In this accident, more
than 120 oftloers and men lost their lives
in the 'execution of their duties.
The. Navy Ministry's announcement of
this diauter shocked the Japanese people,
who had not much knowledge of the
training of the Navy. It aroused con-
siderable criticism of the Navy, even in
the newspapers. One paper said in its
editorial: "There should be a limit to
the intensity of the training. Can there
be any excuse for sinking a warship of
His Imperial Majesty's and causing the
death of many loyal officers and menl"
On the other hand, there were also
many people, especially among veterans
of the Navy, who sent letters of sympathy
to the naval authorities. Among them
was Vice-Admiral Keisaburo Moriyama.
In answer. he reoeived the following letrer
of thanks from the Commander in Chief:
"I mWlt thank you for your w.,m~thy
and enoourapment. It ia .. if I had mil·
lions of npportenl. The aooident....· • bolt
from the blue ill tbNe times of tranquillity and
.-ee.at.any.prioe atm08phere. Yet the naval
au~oritiOll conoemed had in their minda all been
prepared for auoh an eventuality, In the face of
$ and diffioulty. the offioo,.. and men aref . their dutiOll with oompoeure and aresat' to lIlWlrifloo themlelvoe ill ardor to supple·
ment the IIbortlip of the 5:613 ratio. I wiah to
beg you to make further effort. tow'" making
tbe publio uadentaad tbe heroic Ipirit of u-e
office,.. and men. for I su~ there • DO bet_
JD8&DlII of OOMOq t.be sparita of more tbao 1JO
herooe. Tbe mora1o of the~ hae DOt t- ill
tbe Ieut. afteoted by this great 1I8CI'i1loe. On the
contrary, making 'good U80 of this incident, the
offioonl and men have encouraged me and have
given me further aid. Standing between my
80llge of I'll8ponaibility for the dead and the future
t.roining of the Fleet, 1 oannot hel~::ring ill my
heart. 1 have been deeply imp by your
letter. It will be a eouroe of great aatillfaotion to
me if you wiD I'Mt 888tU'8d regarding the future
of too Navy, (or I am detennined to do my belIt
to protect the Imperial Navy in the (at'e o( any
._i1AQ~."
DlKUTABLB POLICY
When our fleet continued its maneuvers.
I asked the Commander in Chief: "It
seems that the incident has become a
subject of much discussion among the
people. Will you continue the training
as it is or will you show some discretion
hereafter? "
To this, the Commander in Chief replied
decisively: "Since I think that war has
already broken out with the United
States, I will oontinue this training by
every possible means. I will do it as
long as I posse88 His Imperial Majesty's
oonfldenoe. regardless of whether I am
critioized by the people. No matter
what happens, we must defeat the United
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States, 80 I will continue our pre-arranged
training." .
Vice-Admiral Moriyama recently made
the following remarks in a speech en-
titled "Intense Training of our Navy,"
in which he referred to the accident of
August 24, 1927:
"Although it may sound like an eJl;treme view,
we mUllt. always expect victims to fall to the risky
maneuvers of the Navy. Maneuvers which do not
risk the lives of the officers and men are of no
1188 to actual war . . . . The comment of the
Japaneee people on this incident W8ll most violent
and of a heartl_, ignorant, and irresponsible
nature. Despite the fact that they were a naval
nation, they not only lacked knowledge of the sea
but were intoxicated by the poison of Anglo.
American·made peace."
Regarding the Captain of the ill-fated
Jint8u, Vice-Admiral Moriyama stated:.
"One thing which must not be forgotten is the
heroio death of Captain Keiji Mizuki, Ca~tain of
the Jinlftl. Be took the entire responsibility for
this accident upon himeelf. After calmly awaiting
the judgment of the ('oun-martial, he returned to
hie home and compotledly killed himllelf b)' hill O\\TI
hand. Bill Wall a noble character and a heroic
death! It Wall a ~t IIllcrifice brought about
by inteDlle training. '
With the carrying out of so severe a
training, the fighting ability made re-
markable progress. As time went on,
the position of Commander in Chief of
the Combined Fleet was occupied by
various men: Admiral Kato was followed
by Admiral Taniguchi, Admiral Eisuke
Yamamoto, Admiral Seizo Koba~'ashi,
Admiral Nobumasa Suetaugu, myseH,
Admiral Osami Nagano, Admiral Zengo
Y08hida, and Admiral Isoroku Yamamo-
to. Yet all these successive Commanders
in Chief have held fast to the belief that
there can be no limit to training and
that the war with t1\e United States was
already going on. Each has handed
down the ideas of Admiral Kato to his
IUccessor. And the training of the Japa-
nese Navy has increased in intensity "ith
the years.
AIRPLANES AND MANEUVEKS
As I recall my own past, I remember
that in 1928 an aerial battle unit con-
sisting of two airplane carriers and a
group of destroyers was for the first time
organized as part of the Combined Fleet
of the Imperial Navy. I was appointed
Commander of that unit and served itl:
that capacity for two years (192 -29).
At that time, Japanese airplanCC's were
very obsolete.
When in 1929 the unit was mal1eU\·<.>ring
south of Chosen, the airplanes which had
flown from the carrier got lost due to a
Budden change in weather and could not
find their way back. (They had dis-
covered and attacked the enemy in the-
far distance and had failed to return by
the time they were expected.) Soon
there came a messa·ge f.rom them: ;·Car-
rier unlocatable." They were notified of
the whereabouts of the carrier, and every
means was tried to make the ('arric....
visible to the planes. But in vain. The
wind blew so hard that the spra~· from
the waves was carried twice the h<.>ight
of the mast of the warship. The planes
reported: "Fuel for only 20 more min-
utes left; carrier still unlocatable; im-
mediately notify whereabouts." 'The
planes hurried, and the carners hurried.
Still they could not locate their carrier-.
"Fuel for onJy 10 more minutes." thcn,
"Fuel for only 5 more minutes." After
that, communications ceased. The pillnes
had made forced landings on the sea.
The majority of the crews, ho\\,e\·cr,.
were rescued by fishing trawlers, and
casualties were comparatively few. The-
Captain of the A kagl: at that time was
Captain Isoroku Yamamoto, now Com-
mander in Chief of the Combined Fleet·
of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Various kinds of accidents occurred
after that, some of them remaining un-
published, and this is hardly the place too
speak about them. While I was the-
Commander in Chief of the First Fleet of
the Imperial Navy, for instance, a de-
stroyer was sunk. Great damage was
also sustained in a terrific hurricane.
But the more strenuous the training. the
more polished the technique.
"COME ON, us NAVY!"
Meanwhile, as a result of the Manchu-
rian Incident and the China Emergency,
the relations between Japan and
the Anglo-American powers worsened.
Throughout this period, the Japanese
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Navy continued its strenuous training.
This ha.s resulted in its profound self-
confidence, not a siJlgle member of it
showing any hesitation when. comparing
the men-of-wa,r of Japan with those of
the United States. Every officer and
man felt: "COme on, US Navy, drop in
any time." While there was no neces-
sity to start a war from our side, we were
Cl,uite confident, each and all of us, that
we would beat the US Navy without
fail, should a war break out. .
Well, the wal' actually did break ont
on December 8 a year ago, and the
achievements since then have proved
that the Imperial Navy is much stronger
than even we had expected. Nobody
can tell. of course, what kind of battles
will still be fought; but one thing is cer-
tain and that is that the Imperial Navy
will knock out the US Fleet, should it
ever come.
. What worries the men and officers of
the Imperial Japanese forces most is, not
that the ships or airplanes of the US
NaV) are-daily increasing in numbers, but
that they may never come to the Pacific.
.All, would be well if they came; but if
they do Dot there will be little chance of
liquidating ·them. If they hesitate too
long in coming, 'the Japanese' Navy might
even proeeed to the AWmtio; we all recall
the· recent reports of. a tJapaneee sub-
marine calling at a German bale and
sailing from there for ·further activities.
The sphere of activity of the Imperial
Japanese Navy is Dot necessarily limited
to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Wher-
ever there is a sea route, the Imperial
Navy will go. The fact that the navies
of Japan and Oermany recently shook
hands, and that 80me German submarines
came to the Indian Ocean or Japanese
submarines sailed to the Atlantic, may
Dot have brought about any concrete war
results. But, as I believe, it has ac-
complished a great spiritual achievement
by showing the close co-opera.tion be-
tween the Axis powers.
A VISIT TO KASUMIGA-UBA
Nobody can ten how long the war will
last, and while it goes on there may
possibly be some hardships which have·
to be overcome. But the whole nation,.
firmly believing in the certainty of vic-
tory, will do its utmost in its individual
work and in the establishing of the Grenter
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere for ful-
filling the great mission of creating the
world family of nations.
The young officers and men of the
Imperial Japanese Forces have risen to
great heights, not only in technique but
also spiritually. We thought that we
did fairly well &8 young officers during the
RU8so-Japanese War; but everyone who·
has returned from the front today says
that the young officers and men have all
grown into great men.
Let me tell you an episode which moved'
me greatly. It took place at the aviation
corps at Kasumiga-ura, where I went to
inspect aerial training the other day. and
it was told to me by the Commander.
Not long before, a group of young officers·
had completed their period of training,
lllld a send-off party for the graduating
officers was held in a hangar on the day
before their departure for the front..
Everyone had a grand time, with the'
exception of one young ensign whose
countenance was extremely gloomy. He
was observed by the Commander, who
later called the ensign into his room and
asked him whether he were ill or if any-
thing were the matter. To this the
e~ replied: "Since I have been asked
80 kindly, I feel it my duty to reply
candidly. I cannot help but feel miser-
able and disgusted today."
"But whyt AU the rest of you are in
high spirits and thrilled at being able to
proceed to the front for active service.
How is it that you alone are 80 depressedl"
"I have been trained for several months.
now at this Kasumiga-ura corps, and I
have exerted my might and main, cherish-
ing a single desire: to start knocking down
American airplanes the day following the
conclusion of my training at Kasumiga-
ura.. But now I have been assigned to
a reconnoitering plane, with which I
cannot knock out American planes. I
had hoped very much to be assigned to.
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enemy confronting them. They are be-
yond life and death, aflame with the spirit
of patriotism.
This is not only the case with the
officers and men of the air force but
holds good for every officer and man
of the Imperial Japanese Forces. The
mental state they have attained is such
that they do not think of future promo-
tions: their one idea is to defeat their
enemy. Their utmost endeavors may
eventually get them either decorated
with the Order of the Golden Kite or
enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine; but
such results are nothing but potential,
and never their aim. The only thing
they desire to accomplish is the fulfill-
ment of their mission.
I would like to see the youth of Japan
never become businessmen only for the
purpose of enriching themselves, nor' ever
become 80ldiers for the sake of being
general one day, nor ever join the civil
service to be appointed minister: instead
I would have everyone do his or her very
best at the job on hand, no matter wheth-
er engaged in agriculture or working in
factories. This is the only way to win
this war. I believe that all Japanese
young people are actually living their
lives in this spirit. Not only the
youth of Japan but every member of
the Japanese race, in full knowledge of
the character of his country~uperiorto
that of any other country of the 'world
and with a spirit unique in the world-
must consider himself to have been
placed in a battle position and must do
his utmost in the work· in whioh
he is engaged. I firmly believe
that by this means the ,war can-
not fail to be won.
•••
, The episode ends here; but that Com-
mander later said that all the officers and
men lwder training at Kasumiga-ura are
-of the, same caliber as this yo~ ensign.
'They do their utmost in their traim,.g
with t~e one hope of knocking down
American airplanes beginning with the day
.after their graduation. They expect to
be killed R,t any time and, therefore, they
never t.hink· of accumulating experience
to be used later when promoted to higher
ranks. Nor do they even think
-of being promoted to higher
ranks in future times. They only
think of knocking down the
.a better plane, and that is why I am 80
unhappy and distressed."
The Commander then said: "That's
too bad, but not everybody can be as-
'5igned to fighting planes. Since you are
young, you must gain experience with
reconnoitering machines. mine-laying
planes, bombers, pursuit planes, etc.
Later you will be promoted to the head
ilf a group, commander of an aerial unit,
commander of an aerial battle unit, and
80 on, when you will qnd the actual
fiying experience-gained while young-
useful and important. Think of that and
<lon't make yourself 80 unhappy."
But the young ensign did not appear
to be a,t all convinced by this lecture.
His commanding officer felt slightly vexed
.and ailked: "Don't you understand yetl
After great hesitation, the ensign re-
plied: "I am not going to argue with
you at all, sir. But may I ask you, sir,
.jf you think I shall live that long?" This
last remark so moved the commanding
-officer that he could only nod his assent.
,t i.e nothing but the striving towards a certain goal that
(!IQ makes life tolerable.
Schiller
